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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
TAXATION: Legality of Motors Fuels and Income Taxes Within
Indian Country
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995)
The Chickasaw Nation appealed a ruling by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, which had granted the State of
Oklahoma the power to impose several state taxes against the Tribe and its
members. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
ruling and held that without congressional authorization, the State could not
impose a motor fuels tax on fuel sold by the Tribe at its retail stores situated
on trust land and that the State could not tax the wages of tribal members
employed by the Tribe but residing beyond Indian country.' The Supreme
Court of the United States granted the State's petition for certiorari.
This case concerns the taxing authority of the State of Oklahoma over the
Chickasaw Nation (the Tribe) and its members. The Court considered two
questions: whether Oklahoma may impose a motor fuels excise tax upon fuel
sold by Chickasaw Nation retail stores located on tribal trust land and
whether Oklahoma may impose a state income tax upon members of the
Chickasaw Nation who are employed by the Tribe but who live outside
Indian country.2
The Chickasaw Nation, a federally recognized Indian tribe, contended that
Oklahoma's fuels tax was levied on tribal retailers, not on distributors or
consumers, and therefore was violative of the respect due to the Chickasaw
Nation's sovereignty. The Tribe maintained that the State could not collect
its fuels tax at tribal convenience stores without explicit congressional
permission. The Tribe's contention of tax immunity is supported by the
Court's ruling in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe3 in which the Court held, "the
Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over
relations with Indian tribes. In recognition of the sovereignty retained by
Indian tribes even after formation of the United States, Indian tribes and
individuals generally are exempt from state taxation within their own
territory."4
1. Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 31 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 1994)
2. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995).
3. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
4. Id. at 764.
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Also citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, the State of Oklahoma maintained
that the Chickasaw Nation was not inevitably but only "generally" immune
from state taxation! Oklahoma asserted that even if the legal incidence of
the fuels tax falls on the Tribe as retailer, no tax immunity should be
allowed because the State's interest in supporting the levy is compelling
when compared with the Tribe's insubstantial interest. Furthermore, the State
contended, the state tax would have no effect on tribal governance and self-
determination. Thus, Oklahoma asserted, a balancing test approach would be
appropriate - balancing the state and tribal interests. In the alternative, the
State contended that the legal incidence of the tax did not fall on the
retailers. Additionally, the State asserted for the first time that even if the tax
were impermissible on other grounds, taxation of this type was authorized
under the Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1936.6 The State asserted that the Act
expres;ly authorized States to tax motor fuel sales on "United States military
or other reservations." Oklahoma maintained that the word "reservation"
encompassed Indian reservations.
The Court dispensed with the State's late assertion of the Hayden-
Cartwright Act as permitting state levies on motor fuels sold on Indian
reservations, and refused to entertain the argument.7 Because the State made
no reference to the Hayden-Cartwright Act in the courts of first and second
instance, and did not mention the 1936 legislation in its petition for
certiorari, the Court declined to address the question of statutory
interpretation. The Court held that "as a court of review, not one of first
view, we will entertain issues withheld until merits briefing 'only in the most
exceptional cases.' This case does not fit the bill."8
5. Il.
6. 4 U.S.C. § 104 (1994). Section 10 of the Act reads in pertinent part:
(a) All taxes levied by any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia upon,
with respect to, or measured by, sales, purchases, storage, or use of gasoline or
other motor vehicle fuels may be levied, in the same manner and to the same
extent, with respect to such fuels when sold by or through post exchanges, ship
stores, ship service stores, commissaries, filling stations, licensed traders, and other
similar agencies, located on United States military or other reservations, when such
fuels are not for the exclusive use of the United States. Such taxes, so levied, shall
be paid to the proper taxing authorities of the State, Territory, or the District of
Columbia, within whose borders the reservation affected may be located.
(b) The officer in charge of such reservation shall, on or before the fifteenth
day of each month, submit a written statement to the proper taxing authorities of
the State, Territory, or the District of Columbia within whose borders the
reservation is located, showing the amount of such motor fuel with respect to
which taxes are payable under subsection (a) for the preceding month.
Id.
7. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2219.
8. Id. at 2219 (citing Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992)).
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The Court then turned to the State's call for a balancing test to determine
whether the State's exaction was permissible. Weighing the relevant state and
tribal interests, Oklahoma urged that the balance tilted in the State's favor.
To support this claim, Oklahoma emphasized that the fuel sold was used
almost exclusively on state roads, imposing a very substantial burden on the
State but no burden at all on the Tribe.' As evidence that the levy did not
reach any value generated by the Tribe on trust land, the State pointed to the
fact that the fuel was neither produced nor refined in Indian country, and
was generally sold to non-tribal members.
The Court noted that it had, on previous occasions, balanced federal, state,
and tribal interests in diverse contexts. For example, it engaged this balance
when assessing state regulations that do not involve taxation" and state
attempts to compel Indians to collect and remit taxes actually imposed on
non-Indians. The Court, however, stated that when a state attempts to levy
a tax directly on an Indian tribe or its members residing within Indian
country, rather than on non-Indians, a more categorical approach should be
employed. 3 The Court cited County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Nation, a case in which it used this categorical
approach, holding that "'[a]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other federal
statutes permitting it,' a State is without power to tax reservation lands and
reservation Indians."'4 The Court recalled several decisions holding state
taxes unenforceable where the legal incidence rested on a tribe or on tribal
members inside Indian country. 5
The bearer of the legal incidence of a tax, the Court stated, is the decisive
question. If the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe or on tribal
members for sales made within Indian country, the tax cannot be enforced
without clear congressional authorization. 6 But if the legal incidence is
borne by non-Indians, no categorical bar prevents the State from enforcing
the tax. So, the proper question in the instant case was whether the legal
9. Id. at 2220.
10. Id.
11. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214 (1987) (holding
balancing interest affected by State's attempt to regulate on-reservation high-stakes bingo
operation).
12. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463, 483 (1976) (holding balancing interests affected by State's attempt to require tribal sellers
to collect cigarette tax on non-Indians).
13. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2220.
14. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
258 (1992) (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
15. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (involving tax on Indian-owned
personal property situated in Indian country); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164 (1973) (involving tax on income earned on reservation by tribal members residing on
reservation).
16. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2220.
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incidence of Oklahoma's fuels tax rests on the Tribe (as retailer), the
nontribal wholesalers who sell to the Tribe, or the nonmember consumers
who purchase fuel from the Tribe. 7
The Court found that a legal incidence test provides a bright-line standard
which responds to the need for substantial certainty as to the permissible
scope of state taxation authority in Indian country. The legal incidence test,
with its bright-line rule, affords the State the opportunity to amend its tax
laws to shift the burden if it is found that the State is unable to enforce a tax
because it the legal incidence rests on the Indian tribes. 8 The legal
incidence test may be contrasted with the balancing test advocated by the
State which involves the daunting task of considering numerous factors
which could "engulf the States' annual assessment and taxation process, with
the validity of each levy dependent upon a multiplicity of factors that vary
from year to year, and from parcel to parcel."'9
The State of Oklahoma argued that even if the legal incidence test is the
proper test to apply when determining whether a tax is permissible, the Tenth
Circuit erred when it held that in this case, the Tribe (as retailer) bears the
burden of the tax. However, the Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals
ruling on this point finding it to be reasonable. This particular piece of
legislation does not expressly identify who bears the tax's legal incidence,
nor does it contain a "pass through" provision requiring distributors and
retailers to pass the tax's cost on to consumers.
The Court stated that when a statute does not express who bears the
incidence of a tax, the question becomes one of a "fair interpretation of the
taxing statute as written and applied."' The Court found that distributors,
under the Oklahoma legislation, were no more than "agents of the State for
tax collection."' Under the statute, sales between distributors are tax
exempt' but sales from distributors to retailers are subject to taxation.'
Distributors are required to first "remit" the tax due to the Oklahoma State
Tax Commission "on behalf of a licensed retailer," and later collect the same
amount from the retailer.' As payment for their services as "agents for the
State," distributors are allowed to retain a small portion of the taxes they
collect.' If a distributor remits taxes it subsequently is unable to collect
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2221.
19. Ad. (quoting Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 692).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2222.
22. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 507 (1991).
23. Id. § 505(E).
24. Ad. § 505().
25. Ad. § 506(a).
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from the retailer, the distributor may deduct the uncollected amount from its
future payments to the Tax Commission.'
By comparison, the Court stated that the fuels tax law contained no
language indicating that retailers were simply collection agents who passed
the burden of the tax on to the consumers.' The law does not set off the
retailer's liability when consumers fail to make payments due, nor does it
compensate retailers for their collection efforts.' The Court concluded by
quoting from the Court of Appeals opinion: "The import of the language and
the structure of the fuel tax statutes is that the distributor collects the tax
from the retail purchaser of the fuel; the motor fuel taxes are imposed on the
retailer rather than on the distributor or the consumer."'29
The Court later turned to the issue of Oklahoma's income tax. The Tenth
Circuit declared that the State may not tax the wages of members of the
Chickasaw Nation who work for the Tribe, including those tribal members
residing beyond Indian country." However, the Supreme Court found that
the Tenth Circuit decision conflicted with a well-established international
principle of taxation: A taxing sovereignty may tax all the income of its
residents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction. 1 "That the
receipt of income by a resident of the territory of a taxing sovereignty is a
taxable event is universally recognized."32 The Tribe attempted to block the
State from exercising its ordinary prerogative to tax the income of every
resident and preclude from state taxation the income of tribal members who
live outside Indian country but work for the Tribe.3 As support for its
contention, the Tribe proffered the rule that Indians and Indian tribes are
generally immune from state taxation.' The Court took note of the
conspicuous absence of an assertion by the Tribe that the State tax infringed
on tribal self-governance. 5 Rather, the Tribe chose to rely on the argument
26. Id. § 505(C).
27. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2222.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 31 F.3d 964, 971 (10th Cir.
1994)). Oklahoma has already created legislation which attempts to shift the legal incidence of
its motor fuels tax to the supplier. H.R. No. 2208, Okla. 45th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (1995). As
of February 15, 1996, the revised bill has passed both houses of the Oklahoma legislature. The
bill requires licensed suppliers to collect Oklahoma's tax on behalf of the purchaser, presumably
leaving market forces to insure reimbursement by tribal retailers. Id. § 22. The bill does,
however, expressly prohibit any person (defined to include a tribe) from selling, using, delivering,
storing, or importing motor fuel as to which the tax has not been paid or accrued by the supplier.
Id. § 48.
30. Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 31 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 1994).
31. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2222.
32. Id. (quoting New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312 (1937)).
33. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2223.
34. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 93 S. Ct. 1257 (1973).
35. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2223.
No. 1]
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that the Oklahoma levy impaired rights granted or reserved to the Tribe by
federal law via the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. 6 The Tribe asserted
that it was immaterial that the tribal members, upon whom the State imposed
its income tax, lived beyond Indian country. The State's income tax is a law
"for the government of the Chickasaw Nation and their descendants.
Descendant, as it is used in the Treaty, includes tribal members employed by
the Tribe notwithstanding the fact that they live outside Indian country.""
The Court held that even a liberal construction of the Treaty would not
support the Tribe's argument." The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, by its
terms, only applies to persons and property within the Chickasaw Nation's
limits. The Treaty cannot be read, the Court wrote, to confer supersovereign
authority to interfere with another jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax
income, from all sources, of those who choose to live within that
jurisdiction's limits. 9
The Tribe, joined by the United States4 , urged the Court to read the
Treaty from the viewpoint that a tax on government employees should be
treated as a tax on the government.4" Likewise, a tax on tribal members
employed by the Tribe would be seen as an impermissible tax on the Tribe
itself.
The Court, however, found no reason to believe that those who drafted
and signed the Treaty meant to incorporate this now-defunct view.42 The
purpose of the Treaty was to separate the Tribe from the States. Under the
36. Id.; see Treaty with the Choctaw (Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek), U.S.-Choctaw
Nation, Sept. 27, 1830, art. 4, 7 Stat. 333, 333-34, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAW AND
TREAtiEs 310, 311 (Charles J. Kappler ed., photo. reprint 1975) (1904) [hereinafter KAPPLER'S].
The Treaty provides in pertinent part:
The Government and people of the United States are hereby obliged to secure to
the said Chickasaw Nation ... the jurisdiction and government of all the persons
and property that may be within their limits west, so that no Territory or State
shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the Chickasaw Nation
... and their descendants ... but the U.S. shall forever secure said Chickasaw
Nation from, and against, all [such] laws ....
Id.
37. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2224.
38. Id. at 2224 (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247-48
(1985) (holding treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians)),
39. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2224.
40. The United States is not a disinterested party. It formed an alliance with the Tribe for
revenue enhancement purposes. In computing ones federal income tax, an employee is allow to
deduct ny state income tax as an itemized deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 164(a)(3). Thus, an
exemption of wages from state income tax increases federal income tax revenue.
41. This now-repudiated view, first espoused in Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County,
41 U.S. 435 (1842), became know as the Dobbins rule. But see Graves v. New York ex ret.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,480 (1939) (holding that the theory, which once won a qualified approval,
that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source, is not longer tenable).
42. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2224.
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Treaty, the Tribe moved across the Mississippi River to unsettled lands to
put distance between the Tribe and the States.43 The Court also found it
unlikely that the signatories even gave thought to a State's authority to tax
tribal members living outside of Indian country because they did not expect
any members to be living there.' Furthermore, if taxes on wages earned by
tribal employees were categorized as taxes of the Tribe itself, it would
require an exemption for all employees of the Tribe. The exemption would
have to extend to tribal members as well as nonmembers.
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to the motor
fuels tax, reversed the judgment as to the income tax, and remanded the case
for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion."
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
WATER RIGHTS: Off-Reservation Stream Adjudication
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The United States creates federal reservations by withdrawing land from
the public domain and reserving that land for a particular, specific purpose.
Courts have long applied the federal reserved water rights doctrine to
reserved lands, giving the United States the appurtenant unappropriated
waters necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was
created.'
On November 19, 1987, an Idaho state court ordered the general stream
adjudication of water rights for the Snake River basin. The United States
was joined pursuant to the McCarran Amendment,47 which waives sovereign
immunity in water rights adjudications, including water rights held in trust
by the government for an Indian tribe. Consequently, in 1990, the Fort Hall
Water Rights Agreement, later ratified as the Fort Hall Water Rights Act of
1990" - between the United States, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, the
State of Idaho, and Idaho water users - was reached quantifying federal
reserved water rights within the boundaries of the Fort Hall Reservation as
well as trust lands appurtenant to the reservation. The agreement, however,
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Court implied that some justiciable issues may remain in regards to income taxation,
noting in Chickasaw Nation that "[t]he Tribe's claim, as presented in this case, is a narrow one.
The Tribe does not assert here its authority to tax the income of these tribal members. Nor does
it complain that Oklahoma fails to award a credit against state taxes for taxes paid to the tribe."
Id. at 2223 n.13.
46. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 601 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575-78 (1908).
47. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-602, 104 Stat. 3059.
No. 11
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did not settle the Shoshone-Bannock claims to water rights in the Snake
River basin beyond the reservation. The Tribes based their claim on the 1868
Treaty of Fort Bridger49 which reserved to the Tribes the right to hunt upon
the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game could be found
thereon." Thus, the Tribes asserted that water necessary for this purpose
federal reserved waters - must also have been reserved.
Although the BIA began instream flow quanitifications in 1989, the merits
of the Tribes' contentions were not considered until 1992 when the Interior
Department asked the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes to submit documentation
and arguments supporting their claim to off-reservation waters. Prompted by
the state district court order that all remaining federal claims to Snake River
waters be filed by March 23, 1993, the Interior Department accelerated its
efforts to evaluate the merits of the Shoshone-Bannock claim.
In November 1992, the Regional Solicitor informed the Shoshone-
Bannock Tribal Council he would recommend against the Justice Department
filing a claim for off-reservation water on behalf of the Tribes. However, he
asked the Tribes to supplement their claims with historical information and
informed the Tribes that the United States had hired a historical expert to
investigate. Two more meetings occurred and information was exchanged.
Nevertheless, on March 4, 1993, the Regional Solicitor recommended the
United States not file on behalf of the Tribes and informed the Tribes of this
decision on March 22, the day before the mandated deadline. The Shoshone-
Bannock then commenced the instant action against the Attorney General
seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgement that the United States
had violated its trust responsibility by refusing to file the claims and an order
compelling the Attorney General to file the tribal claims.
On March 24, 1993 the district court granted a temporary restraining order
requiring the United States to file the claims in Idaho state court. The
district court later denied the Tribes' motion for a preliminary injunction and
dismissed the claims. The Tribes appealed, asking the federal court to
force the United States to file on their behalf. 3
The circuit court acknowledged the fact that the Attorney General's
authority to control the course of the federal government's litigation is
presumptively immune from judicial review, whether the action is a civil or
criminal matter.' However, the court noted, the Attorney General's power
49. Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshone and Bannock (Treaty of Ft. Bridget), July 3,
1968, 15 Stat. 673, reprinted in KAPPLER'S, supra note 36, at 1020.
50. Id. at art. IV, 15 Stat. at 674, reprinted in KAPPLER'S, supra note 36, at 1021.
51. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1479 (1995).
52. Id. The district court found that the Tribes were neither likely to succeed on the merits
of their claim nor likely to suffer irreparable harm if the motion were denied. Id.
53. The Interior and Justice Departments concluded the Tribes' claims were without merit
and thus would not file and defend the claims in the state adjudication. They did not deny the
Tribes' rights to proceed on their own. Id. at 1480.
54. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Newman v. United States,
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to supervise litigation in which the United States is interested is not without
limitation.55 Constitutional, as well as statutory rights, may limit Attorney
General discretion.' Finding no such restriction upon discretion in this area,
the court held that the Attorney General's refusal to assert the tribal claims
in the Idaho water rights adjudication was presumptively within her
discretion under statutory law.'
Referring to the fiduciary capacity in which the United States acts on
behalf of Indian tribes, the court maintained that a tribe "cannot force the
government to take a specific action unless a treaty, statute or agreement
imposes, expressly or by implication, that duty."58 The court rejected the
Tribes' position that the "mere existence" of the Treaty of Fort Bridger
required the federal government to protect whatever claims to off-reservation
water the Tribes wish to make. 9 Moreover, the court noted that professional
ethics, as well as Idaho's counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
I I,' also precluded obligating the Attorney General from filing what she
considers meritless claims.6
Holding that the scope of the United States's duty to an Indian tribe
depends on the underlying substantive law giving rise to that obligation, the
circuit court decided the Treaty did not suggest that the United States could
be forced to litigate apparently meritless claims simply at the insistence of
the Tribes.62 Thus,the court wrote, "to the extent that the government had
some duty to evaluate the Tribes' position before rejecting it, it fulfilled that
obligation" and could not be forced to further pursue the tribal claims.63
382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966); Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491,
500-01 (1977); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27-29 (1947).
55. Shoshone-Bannock, 56 F.3d at 1481.
56. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608; see also United States v. California, 332 U'S. 19, 19 (1947);
Swift v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331 (1928).
57. Shoshone-Bannock, 56 F.3d at 1481. The court cited the authority-conferring statute, 25
U.S.C. § 175, as imposing only a "discretionary duty" of representation, not as withdrawing
discretion from the Attorney General. Moreover, the court compared the Attorney General's
decision not to file on behalf of the Tribes with an agency refusal to enforce its regulations,
which are presumptively unreviewable. Id.
58. Id. at 1482.
59. Id.
60. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require all pleadings, written motions and other
papers be signed by at least one attorney of record. F.R.C.P. 11 (a). By presenting such to the
court, the attorney is certifying to the best of his knowledge, it is not being presented for any
improper means, the claims contained therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument, and the allegations have evidentiary support. F.R.C.P. 1 l(b)(l)-(3). Sanctions are
provided for violations of this rule. F.R.C.P. 11 (c).
61. Shoshone-Bannock, 56 F.3d at 1481.
62. Id.
63. Id.
No. 1]
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAND CONSOLIDATION: Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments
Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194 (9th Cir. 1995).
Once again, courts have ruled that the escheat provision of the Indian
Land Consolidation Act (ILCA)" "effects an unconstitutional taking" in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.65
The escheat provision of ILCA is an attempt to solve the problem of
severely fractionated Indian land.' In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Indian
lands that belonged to a tribe were allotted to individual Indians.' When
an allottee died intestate, the allotment would pass to several heirs with
undivided interests. Over the years, ownership of these parcels of land has
become severely fractionated into many undivided interests.'
Frequently, one parcel of land will have dozens of owners, or one individual
will own fractional shares in as many as forty different allotments. The
income from many of these parcels is slight, and in some instances amounts
to a mere one cent per month.69
Congress has twice sought to remedy this problem by means of the Indian
Land Consolidation Act. Through this Act, Congress attempted to
consolidate ownership in fractionated land by forcing such land to escheat
to the tribe when it no longer met its definition of productive land (i.e., a
two percent interest in a parcel incapable of earning $100 over a period of
two years was subject to escheat). In Hodel v. Irving," Congress' first
attempt was found to be an unconstitutional taking because it effectively
banned both descent and devise of land, amounting to an uncompensated
taking.7' Consequently, Congress amended the Act in 1991.7 However, in
the instant case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals again found the amended
escheat provision to be an unconstitutional taking.'
The amended Act still effectively prohibited both descent and devise of
unproductive land, but narrowed the class of land subject to escheat and
created a narrow exception allowing a limited form of devise under certain
conditions. A "fractional interest" subject to escheat to the tribe was defined
64. Indian Land Consolidation Act § 207, 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994).
65. Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194, 200 (9th Cir. 1995).
66. Id. at 195.
67. Id. at 196 (citing General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, and Fort Peck
Allotment Act of 1908, ch. 237, 35 Stat. 558).
68. Id. (citing Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 708 (1987)).
69. Id.
70. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
71. Id. at 711.
72. 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994).
73. Youpee, 67 F.3d at 200.
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in the amended Act as a two per cent (or less) interest in a parcel that is
"incapable of earning $100 in any one of thefive years from the date of the
decedent's death."' 4 The Act further allowed the devise of an otherwise
escheatable interest to any other owner of an undivided fractional interest.75
The amended Indian Land Consolidation Act also provided for tribal
adoption of their own codes to govern the disposition of interests subject to
escheat. However, the Act stated that "the'Secretary shall not approve any
code or law that fails to accomplish the purpose of preventing further descent
or fractionation of any such interests."'76
In Youpee, the Ninth Circuit applied the three-part takings test set out in
Hodel.' The test considers "(1) the economic impact of the statute; (2) its
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
character of the governmental action." 8 First, the fair market value of Mr.
Youpee's fractional interests was $1,239. Therefore, the court found that the
parties had a significant economic interest in the ownership of a parcel, with
which the ILCA still interfered.'
Second, although the court found that the parties' investment-backed
expectations were not infringed by the Act, the circuit court still invalidated
the escheat provision by following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hodel.
Although the land generated little, if any, income for the parties -
"weigh[ing] in favor of the statute's constitutionality"' 
- the factors of the
test must be considered together. Thus, while the parties investment-backed
expectations were not implicated, the economic impact of the statute was still
unconstitutional because the fair market value of the land was significant and
the parties had a valuable interest in the land itself."
In considering the character of the governmental action, the Ninth Circuit
focused on the provision allowing the devise "to any other owner of an
undivided fractional interest in such parcel .. .."' The court stated that
"[i]nstead of allowing the decedent to choose one devisee from the
population, the amended statute restricts the population to a very limited
group, which is unlikely to contain any lineal descendants, and requires the
decedent to choose a devisee from this group.""
74. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
75. Id. § 2206(b).
76. Id. § 2206(c).
77. Youpee, 67 F.3d at 199 (citing Penn. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. "While the income generated by a parcel may be de minimis, the value of the land itself
may not be." Id. (citing Hodel, 481 U.S. at 714).
82. Id,
83. Id.
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Regarding the still-narrow class of potential devisees created by the
amended statute, the court noted that it would be a rare case for a lineal heir
to own an interest in the trust land to be devised by the decedent. In practice
a decedent would not be allowed to devise land to his children, rather the
decedent would be forced to either find a collateral heir who owned such an
interest, give the land to a stranger, or let it escheat to the tribe. Reasoning
that the ability to transfer land to one's heirs is in itself a valuable interest,
the Ninth Circuit found the amendments unacceptable."
The court concluded by mentioning other options which Congress might
pursue such as purchasing the land, condemning the land and providing just
compensation, or finding an acceptable limitation on descent or devise.
However, the Ninth Circuit found that the amended version of the Indian
Land Consolidation Act continued to completely abolish both descent and
devise and was, therefore, an unconstitutional taking without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.85
84. Id. at 199-200.
85. Id. at 200.
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